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Abstract At various strata of the debate, the sense that arguments surrounding euthanasia are no longer 
making significant advances has provoked a variety of attempts to find alternative ethical approaches 
that might break with standard deadlocks. In this essay, we will trail one such move by giving a new 
account of what the ethical stance of Emmanuel Levinas might contribute towards the twin questions of 
the ethical justification and legalisation of euthanasia. Interpreting our fundamental relationship with 
the other in terms of the Biblical injunction ‘Thou shalt not kill’ and refusing to draw any distinction 
between murder and other forms of killing, Levinas is commonly taken to have offered an ethical stance 
that is strongly opposed to euthanasia. Without disagreeing with this interpretation, we will offer an 
account of a further twist on this perspective that renders euthanasia ambiguously the exemplary 
ethical failure and the supreme culmination of ethics, simultaneously separating this ethical question 
entirely from legality. 
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SOMETHING IS AMISS 
 
The philosopher and medical ethicist Margaret P. Battin has published, adopting the term used in a well-
known New York Times Magazine article about her life and work, ‘wheelbarrows full’ of book and 
articles championing the cause of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide since entering the debate in 
the early 1980s.1 It might be somewhat surprising, then, that she began her article on the topic for the 
2003 Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics with the statement: ‘Something is amiss with the debate over 
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.’2  
 
What makes this claim stand out is that those who support the legalisation of euthanasia, simply using 
this word from now on, tend to sound quite satisfied with a debate that they seem convinced they are 
winning or have effectively already won. Organisations in the UK such as the Campaign for Dignity in 
Dying champion statistics such as 82% of the British population supporting a change in the law on 
assisted dying for terminally ill adults, rising to 86% among the disabled and only falling to 79% among 
those who identify as religious.3 The former chairwoman of that of that group, Margaret Branthwaite, 
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expressed a common sentiment among campaigners when she stated that ‘it’s only a matter of time 
before it’s legalized.’4 While rival organisations such as Care Not Killing marshal rather different statistics 
and the UK parliament recently rejected a proposed ‘right to die’ in England and Wales by a significant 
enough majority that the issue is unlikely to return for some time, the tone of campaigning in the 
legalisation movement remains that the march of history is on their side and inexorable. If it is only a 
matter of time, what, then, is amiss? 
 
According to Battin, the primary problem with the ongoing debate relates to established patterns of 
discourse in which the issue is posed in for-and-against terms. While adversarial debate is vital for social 
and ethical issues that are ‘just breaking open’ – a situation where for-and-against analysis isolates, 
identifies, catalogues and critiques relevant elements – ‘once a debate begins to mature, it becomes 
time to pursue attempts at resolution’.5 Rather than an interminable back and forth over already well-
churned ground that promises at best to unearth only an occasional new subtlety, the call for the 
debate to move from infancy to maturity is a push for not only theoretical but practical consensus. The 
obvious obstruction to such a development is that the euthanasia debate barely merits its definite 
article, being highly stratified between a public debate where the strong majority support change and 
specialised debates in legal, political and medical circles where such consensus is lacking. For example, 
while the British Medical Association shifted its position on assisted dying to neutrality in 2005, it 
returned to opposition in 2006 and since then the proposal for adopting a neutral stance has been put 
to the vote and rejected a further five times.  
 
In such a situation, it is not uncommon to hear philosophers promoting their own block of the debate as 
the keystone around which harmony might be established. As Thomas Nagel wrote in his review of L.W. 
Sumner’s Assisted Death: A Study in Ethics and Law, such a book:  
 
provides a superb example of the relevance of philosophy of public policy. The reason is that 
public policy governing treatment at the end of life is to a great extent shaped by philosophical 
confusions. It may not be too much to hope that a book such as this will help to rectify the 
situation.6 
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Indeed, such a hope does not seem entirely unrealistic when sources ranging from the public-facing 
website NHS Choices to Medical Ethics Today: The BMA’s Handbook of Ethics and Law do indeed engage 
with the issues and a vocabulary that was developed in the adversarial debates of philosophers. 
However, without giving too much credence to traditional divisions between analytic and continental 
philosophy, it is notable that both public and specialised discussions engage with a relatively limited 
spectrum of thought in terms of its provenance, style and range of references. Although we encounter a 
certain Kant, we rarely encounter thinkers who might be referred to as post-Hegelian or the currents of 
thought that take place more broadly within the critical humanities. Indeed, insofar as this lack of 
engagement is mutual, one might speculative that a wide spectrum of academics outside of the 
specialist confines of applied and medical ethics do not register the euthanasia debate as politically 
charged in the same manner as the debates surrounding such issues as abortion or intersexuality, in 
which we often find interventions form the critical humanities that disrupt established debates in 
medical ethics.  
 
The underlying inspiration, or at least suspicion, that motivates this article is that insofar as the debate 
among philosophers has become reified, if not ossified, through standard distinctions, patterns of 
engagement and a canon of relevant articles and approaches – evidence of which can be readily found 
in any introductory applied ethics textbook or in the tens of thousands of essays produced annually by 
undergraduates on formulaic questions such as whether an act utilitarian ought to support active 
involuntary euthanasia for terminally ill patients or not – to that very extent philosophy loses its chance 
to play an active mediating role between public and specialised discourse and to prove itself truly 
relevant to public policy. Some of the most promising moments in the euthanasia debate have been 
when a philosopher renews the debate through rejecting its accumulated concepts and concerns via 
adopting an alternative ethical approach in which they simply do not register. A strong example of this 
would be the distinctive account of virtue ethics offered in Liezl van Zyl’s book from 2000 Death and 
Compassion, in which the dominant stream of discussion relating to the ethics of euthanasia is dismissed 
as rooted in ‘monistic’ or ‘principalist’ ethics.7 Where van Zyl’s work becomes even more interesting, 
however, is in her 2002 article ‘Euthanasia, Virtue Ethics and the Law’, in which she turns on the basis of 
her earlier work to the question of whether euthanasia should be legalised in a manner that simply 
bypasses the common issues that cause discussion to stagnate around apparently irresolvable aporias.8 
Without engaging further with the fascinating work of van Zyl, in this article I would like to test whether 
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there is a way of pitching the distinctive approach to ethics offered by the philosopher Emmanuel 
Levinas that might also bypass traditional ways of setting up the distinct questions of euthanasia’s 
ethical status and legalisation.  
 
To briefly step ahead of ourselves, a common structure that we find in almost all strands of the 
euthanasia debate is that the question of whether euthanasia is ethically permissible is a simpler matter 
than the question of whether it should be legalised, simply because whether it should be legalised 
depends on (a) whether it is ethical and (b) some further concern. If euthanasia is ethically 
impermissible, then most would agree it should not be legalised. If euthanasia is ethically permissible, 
then there may still be good reasons for it remaining illegal. For example, that once legalised an 
inevitable ‘slippery slope’ would mean that people who do not want to die would be pressured into 
euthanasia. After addressing Levinas in the following two sections, we will see in the closing section how 
the position we develop on a Levinasian approach to euthanasia breaks with this structure of relating 
the two questions, possibly offering a route for engaging with the question of legalisation that does not 
depend on a simple, positive resolution for the question of ethical permissibility. 
 
FACING THE DEBATE ANEW 
 
The centennial celebration of the birth of Emmanuel Levinas in 2006 exhibited the continued relevance 
and influence of his work across the globe, with thirty-two conferences across thirteen countries. For 
better or worse, Levinas has commonly come to be seen through the lens of one dimension of his work. 
Stealing Hilary Putnam’s appropriation via Isaiah Berlin of a fragment attributed to Archilochus, unlike 
those thinkers akin to foxes who knows many little things, Levinas is a hedgehog who knows one big 
thing: that ‘one big thing’ that his entire philosophy can be seen as unpacking is the claim that ‘ethics is 
first philosophy’.9  
 
The priority of being first can be taken quite literally here: when we engage in a genetic 
phenomenological analysis of experience, we discover at the root of the progressive constitution of our 
intelligible lived world the structure of an ethical relation to another human being rather than an 
ontological relation to Being. Our existence as isolated, independent self-sufficient egos is not false, but 
it is derivative. To capture this notion of the originary status of the ethical encounter in terms amenable 
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to phenomenology, Levinas famously uses the terminology of the other’s face. In our analysis that starts 
from the constituted world as an apparently consistent and meaningful totality, ‘we can proceed from 
the experience of totality back to a situation where totality breaks up, a situation that conditions the 
totality itself. Such a situation is the gleam of exteriority or of transcendence in the face of the Other.’10 
Nevertheless, this imagery of encountering a face is analogical since the originary relation to the other is 
not actually given to the phenomenological gaze. The ‘ultimate event of being’ is ‘essentially noctural’ 
and cannot be brought to light and comprehended.11 ‘The Other is the principle of phenomena’ without 
being given as a phenomena through ‘disclosure’ or even ‘revelation’.12 
 
Despite involving a rather elaborate account of the stages involved in the progressive synthesising and 
structuring of experience, a post-Kantian assumption that might be disputed by many forms of 
contemporary realism, I take it that what Levinas offers to ethical thought is a compelling account of 
motivation. If the world taken as meaningful totality could be constituted without having arisen from an 
originary ethical relationship – if the Other were not the principle of all phenomena – then an 
independent ego might legitimately ask questions such as ‘Why does the other concern me? What is 
Hecuba to me? Am I my brother’s keeper?’.13 In such a universe, Levinas claims that a concern for the 
other who remains outside-of-me would be incomprehensible. Levinas thus offers an archaeology of a 
common ethical substructure, applicable as much to virtue ethics as to principalist normative 
approaches, in which we are at root individual animals driven to persevere in our being by what Spinoza 
would have called the conatus essendi, creatures who then find this disrupted by some further 
specifically human element – reason, virtue, divine revelation, etc. This further element can supposedly 
compel us, at times, to act against our own egoist self-preservation and self-interest. Although the 
surface narrative of Totality and Infinity appears to go along with this schema – the enjoyment and 
nourishment of a dwelling and loving egoist described in Section II having its mode of being radically 
subverted by the election via the face to a properly human mode of being that is dedicated to the Other 
in Section III – that apparent chronological narrative is properly an account of rediscovering the Other 
who is always-already acting as the nocturnal principle of the world as totality. Levinas is flatly sceptical 
about any other account of ethical motivation where that which demands ethics comes through a higher 
faculty to an original conatus. For example, he denies that something like the ‘respect for formal 
universality’, offered by Kant as the cause of our only following maxims that we would legislate for all 
others, could subdue our rapacious animal drives were it not for this original ethical relation.14  
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Whether one is convinced by Levinas’s approach or not, as one of the major, distinctive thinkers of 
ethics in the Twentieth Century one might expect there to already be plenty of scholarship on Levinas 
and euthanasia. This expectation would only be heightened when we consider Jacques Derrida’s famous 
claim that ‘all of Levinas’s thought, from the beginning to the end, was a meditation on death’.15 
However, while Levinas gives us a great deal of material about the role of the ethical relationship in the 
constitution of experience, it is notoriously difficult to draw concrete ethical judgements from his work. 
As Dermot Moran forcefully put it at the beginning of the chapter on Levinas in his Introduction to 
Phenomenology:  
 
it must be made clear at the outset that Levinas has nothing to say about ethics as it is 
traditionally practiced in Western philosophy, since he thinks this tradition has either ignored 
ethics or made it secondary and provisional. Indeed, he explicitly repudiates the traditional 
understanding of ethics as a discipline within philosophy which examines different ways of 
motivating and justifying certain forms of behaviour. He deliberately avoids such topics as the 
nature of ethical justification, the various forms of ethical theory (e.g. utilitarianism, 
deontology), or the meta-ethical analysis of ethical discourse.16  
 
If Moran is right, it would go without saying that Levinas’s ethics also has ‘nothing to say’ about applied 
topics such as euthanasia. Simon Critchley offered a slightly less extreme account of how Levinas’s work 
connects with practical ethics by saying that its relation ‘to conventional moral philosophy, or even 
applied ethics, will at best be oblique, and perhaps even critical. […] [F]or Levinas, the construction of a 
system, or procedure, for formulating and testing the moral acceptability of certain maxims or 
judgements […] is itself derived and distinct from a primordial ethical experience that Levinas’s work 
seeks to describe.’17 Levinas himself certainly seemed to reject the idea that his ethical work produced 
concrete ethical judgements, asking: ‘Is my discourse deficient in concern with concrete reality? Does all 
this metaphysics of mine have the ability to solve actual ethical problems? I have no ambition to be a 
preacher […] it is not my purpose to moralize or to improve the conduct of our generation […] I have 
been speaking about that which stands behind practical morality’.18 Furthermore, as he famously stated 
in a conversation later recounted by Derrida: ‘You know, one often speaks of ethics to describe what I 
do, but what really interest me in the end is not ethics, not ethics alone, but the holy, the holiness of the 
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holy.’19 His status as a reluctant thinker of ethics can be further shown through the fact that his first 
tentative articulation of the originary role of ethics comes in the 1951 article ‘Is Ontology 
Fundamental?’, sixteen years after expressing the problem of being riveted to Being in 1935’s On 
Escape. In the intervening years Levinas made attempts at breaking with the fundamental ontology 
endemic to philosophy that culminates in the climate of Heideggerian thought almost every approach 
except the ethical relation. 
 
Against the statement above from Moran, the so-called ‘Third Wave’ of Levinas scholarship, which 
announced itself in Peter Atterton and Matthew Calarco’s introduction to their 2010 edited volume 
Radicalizing Levinas, demands tangible ethical results. Opposed to the supposed ‘navel gazing’ of 
previous Levinas scholarship, it is a movement concerned with ‘the wider practical and applied 
dimensions of Levinas’s work’ and focuses primarily on ‘exploring progressive sociopolitical issues’ in the 
face of Levinas’s characterisation of a ‘world in pieces’.20 Although the texts in Radicalizing Levinas do 
not pose themselves directly in terms of applied ethics, the topics that emerge in this volume such as 
animal liberation and environmentalism overlap with the concerns of many applied ethicists. 
Nevertheless, the euthanasia debate does not figure. 
 
A possible cause of the relative dearth of material on Levinas and euthanasia is that the most obvious 
reading of Levinas’s ethical position would contribute an answer that is not the one people exploring so-
called progressive socio-political issues are likely to welcome. Whatever the value of oppositions such as 
conservative and progressive when it comes to ethical rather than political issues, Levinas’s actual 
statements on life and death, rooted as they are in the Hebrew scriptures, frequently lend themselves to 
defending quite traditional stances. When fellow phenomenologist of ethics Pope John Paul II evoked 
Levinas’s work as ‘a testimony for our age’ in Crossing the Threshold of Hope, it was in the context of 
defending a pro-life stance on the issue of abortion.21 It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that if Levinas’s 
name is mentioned in the euthanasia debate at all, it is by those opposing the legalisation of euthanasia. 
Paul Schotsmans, for example, evokes Levinas in the context of defending a secularized version of the 
catholic stance on palliative care in which: ‘ultimately there is nothing I can do against this inexorable 
enemy but answer “here I am” with freely-willed and sincerely concerned proximity, and hold her/his 
hand tightly, thus lightening her/his death and making it more bearable.’22 In one of the only English-
language Levinasian texts defending the partial legalisation of euthanasia, Torbens Wolfs notes his 
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article’s exceptional status: ‘Some authors have explained their vision on euthanasia by reference to the 
philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. It is striking that they either reject euthanasia categorically or approve 
of it only in so-called states of necessity. It seems that only opponents of euthanasia appeal to the 
philosophy of Levinas.’23 
 
That Levinas is quite correctly – although we will enact a small twist on this point in the next section – 
understood as a thinker whose account of ethics, if it has anything to say about such issues, would be 
opposed to euthanasia, derives from the manner in which  the commandment ‘Thou shalt not kill’ plays 
an elevated role in his philosophy. When Levinas comes to flesh out his notion of the face, he states 
directly that: ‘The first word of the face is the “Thou shalt not Kill.” It is an order.’24 Indeed, the ‘face is 
that possibility of murder, that powerlessness of being and that authority that commands me: “Thou 
shalt not kill.”’25 This is not simply a negative prohibition for Levinas since we kill far more often through 
inaction than action, meaning that ‘Thou shalt not kill’ is equivalent to ‘Thou shalt cause thy neighbour 
to live’ – not a prohibition to respect but an unending labour of care.26  
 
The easiest way to avoid such a blanket rule against killing is to clarify that the biblical injunction against 
ratsakh is more accurately rendered ‘Thou shalt not murder’. Thus, just as killing in war or when carrying 
out a legal sentence of execution is not ratsakh in the Hebrew Scripture, if euthanasia is agreed to 
constitute something other than murder then the injunction encountered in the other’s face would not 
forbid it. However, while this is an option for many divine command theorists who hold to the 
fundamental status of this commandment, it is not an option for Levinas. Although this precise formula 
arises in the context of killing someone by accident, Levinas is clear throughout his work that ‘there 
would be only one race of murderers’.27 The distinction between the race of murderers and the race of 
manslayers only occurs to us because: ‘Our conscience is not yet wholly conscience. It is a twilight. The 
transition from the non-intentional to the intentional is noticeable. We are not awake enough.’28 
 
I have long found this to be among the most striking phrases in the history of ethical thought. If there is 
only one race of murderers, then the distinctions that we have developed through engaging in back-and-
forth debate – all of the sophisticated issues we tutor undergraduates in – would be the product of a 
half-sleep. Indeed, with each additional nuance, the twilight we produce around ethical debates 
becomes murkier. Perhaps this explains why Levinas had little interest in supporting his account of the 
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primordial ethical experience with a particular account of ethical system building. When we wake up to 
the ethical demand, there will be no excuses or nuances of the kind ethical systems are built to 
recognise. To awaken is to see things in black and white rather than shades of grey. Yet, far from this 
awakening resolving into a strict distinction between saints and sinners, the consequence is the 
overwhelming guiltiness testified to in one of Levinas’s most frequently quoted literary references, 
Zosima’s claim from The Brothers Karamazov that: ‘Each of us is guilty before everyone and for 
everything, and I more than all the others.’29 In less hyperbolic terms, every person in the first world fails 
the commandment ‘Thou shalt cause thy neighbour to live’ daily by enjoying the rewards of the 
economy. We are all of the race of murderers in a world where: ‘Every death is a murder, is premature, 
and there is responsibility of the survivor.’30 Nevertheless, according to Levinas what one cannot do on 
the basis of this is reason like Macbeth that we are so stepped in blood, and furthermore so inevitably 
stepped in blood, that we may as well commit one more atrocity.  
 
THE ULTIMATE SACRIFICE 
 
The primordial ethical experience that Levinas describes as opening the world of phenomena does not 
simply play out in our world. Nobody directly feels infinite ethical election and nobody does everything 
they could to cause their neighbour to live. Nobody – to use another of Levinas’s favourite references – 
gives the other the bread from out of their own mouth, or at least not all of it. Indeed, insofar as anyone 
truly and fully did give the other the bread from out of their own mouth, they would soon not be around 
to do so further. Yet this insatiable and excessive demand is used to explain moments ranging from the 
occasions a person actual does reject the conatus to die for another (Levinas frequently refers to the 
Franciscan friar Maximilian Maria Kolbe who volunteered to die in place of a stranger at Auschwitz) to 
the moment we take a second to hold a door open for a stranger. Above all, our underlying ethical 
election explains the very existence of a guilt that we become attached to, and it is in this context that 
we will address euthanasia below.  
 
It has already been mentioned that Torben Wolfs offers one of the only attempts to defend the 
Levinasian legalisation of euthanasia in particular circumstances. According to Wolfs: ‘Suffering […] is 
inhuman, and this is to be understood literally: it depersonalises. The patient is no longer who he used 
to be. It is as if the patient himself does not live, but that ‘something’ has taken over, something 
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anonymous: ‘it lives’.31 Wolfs is not saying that ratsakh does not cover all acts of killing humans – as 
some divine command theorists claim killing in war is not ratsakh – rather he accepts that all killing of 
humans – including all letting die of humans – is murder. However, in extreme suffering Wolfs claims 
one can cease to be human. This approach can be found in traditional euthanasia debates, for example 
in the work of James Rachels for whom it is morally indifferent if a creature stops biologically being alive, 
what is ethically unaccepting is killing someone who has a life.32 For Wolfs it is wrong to murder a 
human being, but it is not necessarily wrong to put an end to a depersonalised ‘it lives’.  
 
Although this argument makes sense in the context of a hospital ward, it strikes me as untenable for 
Levinas. Surely the most depersonalised, suffering figure we find in the work of post-holocaust writers 
such as Levinas is the Muselmann in a concentration camp? As described by Giorgio Agamben, ‘Nothing 
“natural” or “common,” however, is left in him; nothing animal or instinctual remains in his life. All his 
instincts are cancelled along with his reason. Antelme tells us that the camp inhabitant was no longer 
capable of distinguishing between pangs of cold and the ferocity of the SS.’33 Although Levinas bases his 
phenomenological account of responsibility explicitly on the responsiveness of the other – the 
expressiveness of the face and the absolute loss that occurs when the face ceases to respond and 
becomes a death mask – he cannot allow that in extreme suffering death would already effectively have 
occurred during biological life without absolving those who put the body of the Muselmann out of its 
misery. Levinas will in fact go out of his way to insist on the possibility of shreds of light in even the most 
depersonalized spaces. For example, Levinas refers to the account of the gulags in Vasily Grossman’s Life 
and Fate as offering ‘a complete spectacle of desolation and dehumanization. The book reflects absolute 
despair, and I see no horizon, no salvation for the human race’, yet even here in ‘the decay of human 
relations’ he holds that ‘goodness persists’ albeit as a goodness that, in Ikonnikov’s words, ‘is beautiful 
and powerless, like the dew.’34 This powerless beauty expressed even in a situation of absolute despair 
suggests Levinas is more likely to follow Schotsmans statement above about staying with the dying, 
holding their hand tightly in freely-willed and sincerely concerned proximity. So, is there an alternative 
way of accounting for euthanasia using Levinasian resources? 
 
It is rarely sufficiently appreciated that Levinas’s philosophy is not simply selfless. Although infinite 
ethical responsibility involves immense guilt as we recognise ourselves as murders, we are nevertheless 
deeply attached to this growing guilt and the mode of being beyond mere being that we attain as 
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creatures subject to such guilt – that is, as entities elected to properly human status. Election as ‘total 
altruism’ empties ‘the I of its imperialism and egoism’ in an engagement that is ‘happy’ – albeit with ‘an 
austere and noncomplacent happiness that lies in the nobility of an election that does not know its own 
happiness’.35 Although we need bread and would enjoy it, this finite need and its satisfaction is as 
nothing compared to the desire that only grows in giving bread. In platitudinous terms, it is better to 
give than to receive. Put differently, although we might appear to be engaged in an act of giving when 
we serve the other, it is the other who gives us the greater gift. The other elevates us from the carefree 
life of an egoistic animal following the conatus and partaking in finite enjoyments to being an upright 
human who stands in relation to the infinity of the good beyond Being. Although in the hyperbolic terms 
of Levinas’s description of ethical election we are compelled by a pure desire to care for the other, the 
commitment to ‘cause thy neighbour to live’ is driven by terror at what would happen to us should we 
lose them. If the other ceases to be, we will lose ethical election and return to the carefree life of animal 
enjoyment that, although it might sound superficially attractive, can only be a horrifying prospect to a 
human who has nurtured their desire for the other: 
 
I did not know I was so rich, but I don’t have the right to keep anything anymore. Is the Desire 
for Others appetite or generosity? The Desirable does not satisfy my Desire, it hollows me, 
nourishing me somehow with new hungers. Desire turns out to be bounty. […] As if the 
compassion […] were a hunger […] nourished beyond all saturation, by increasing that hunger, 
infinitely.36 
 
It is beyond the scope of this article to give a full account of the relation between enjoyment, desire, 
responsiveness, responsibility and death at stake in Levinas’s texts.37 One simple way of characterising 
our relation to the other, at least before Levinas produces the concept of the trace, is that they are the 
only free element in our existence. Every other entity we encounter is, ultimately, simply a measurable 
portion of matter that obeys the deterministic laws of physics. It is only when I engage with the other in 
a face-to-face relationship through language that I encounter responsiveness rather than reaction. 
Although some scientific worldviews might deny the above claim, seeing humans as only very 
complicated machines, Levinas is likely to respond that insofar as we view another human in these 
terms we are not engaging with them in a face-to-face relationship. The death of the other can thus be 
seen as a transfer from a universe in which responsiveness between free beings exists to a cage of 
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absolute causal determinism: ‘Death is the disappearance in beings of those expressive movements that 
are always responses. Death will touch, above all, that autonomy or that expressiveness of movement 
that can go to the point of masking someone within his face. Death is the no-response. Those 
movements both hide and inform the vegetative movements.’38 In another vocabulary, there is no 
significant sense of time in a universe of causal necessity – the future is simply the outcome of the 
present – it is only the other who brings the possibility of a future.  
 
It is at this point, where keeping the other alive as a locus of responsiveness is as much a matter of 
protecting my own human existence from annihilation as that of the other, that euthanasia reveals itself 
to entail the most Levinasian of anti-Levinasian twists. Although it seemed that we would do anything 
for the other except the act of euthanasia, we might begin to worry that the reason we would not do 
this is because it would impoverish us rather than them. What if the fury to keep the other alive, even 
when the other states they do not wish to remain alive, stems from horror at the prospect of living-on 
without them? Do we not, then, in killing or in simply letting the singular other die, enact the ultimate 
personal sacrifice: willing returning to a mode of being that is properly unliveable for the sake of obeying 
the other’s demand? Euthanasia would be the end of ethics – the end of the possibility of ethical living, 
of a life worthy of living – for the sake of one last service to the other. It seems then to be both the 
worst and best of acts – we cut ourselves off from the good beyond being, that relationship to infinity 
that constitutes the holy dimension of being human and that Levinas claimed to be his real interest 
rather than ethics, in favour of helping a concrete other. While Levinas will claim that we only relate to 
the divine Other through serving a human other in their simple mortal needs, here we choose the 
human other at the expense of the divine Other. While all other ethical acts implicitly serve our own 
interests, here we have an act that is utterly opposed to our own interests – to both our physical needs 
and our metaphysical desire. To help the other die can therefore be seen as the ultimate sacrifice both 
in terms of being the highest sacrifice and as last sacrifice. Although everything in Levinas’s work 
suggests it would be the highest scandal, perhaps it is also the only death that is not scandalous.  
 
The above is certainly not the only way to approach euthanasia on the basis of Levinas’s work. Indeed, 
an alternative way of approaching the issue might seem to reject the above. If we consider the act of 
euthanasia from the perspective of the one who asks to die rather than the one asked to help, we 
encounter a quite different set of issues relating to Levinas’s pre-ethical work on the impossibility of 
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suicide. Indeed, this is the approach largely taken by A. T. Nuyen in ‘Levinas and the Euthanasia Debate’, 
who only considers euthanasia from the perspective of the one asked to assist in the act very briefly.39 
Although Levinas’s aim in these texts was to reject the romanticised Heideggerian image of the 
existential hero who seizes death resolutely – a figure we are more likely to find choosing death rather 
than divulging the secrets of the Resistance in Sartre or Camus than begging for an end to their suffering 
in a hospital ward – the claim that suicide is ‘a contradictory concept’ frustrates any Levinasian attempt 
to approach or justify euthanasia from a first-person perspective. ‘My mastery, my virility, my heroism 
as a subject can be neither virility nor heroism in relation to death’ and in a world where the ‘whole 
acuity of suffering lies in this impossibility of retreat’ that limitation testifies against those discourses on 
euthanasia that pose the issue in terms of autonomy, taking control or dying on one’s own terms.40 The 
very intelligibility of euthanasia for Levinas would depend on death being conceived as release from 
Being, as a return to nothingness, yet against this Levinas suggests death to be a mystery on the basis of 
the Bergsonian argument that nothingness is a modification of being:  
 
Hamlet is precisely a lengthy testimony to this impossibility of assuming death. Nothingness is 
impossible. It is nothingness that would have left humankind the possibility of assuming death 
and snatching a supreme mastery from out of the servitude of existence. “To be or not to be” is 
a sudden awareness of this impossibility of annihilating oneself.41  
 
Does the impossibility of annihilating oneself, with help or not, impose consequences on the one who is 
asked to help? It is unclear that it does. That the Other might be deceived in their belief that they can 
escape Being is no obvious reason for refusing to assist them, since my obligation is not limited to 
carrying out those acts I endorse as rational. Furthermore, to assume that the whole mechanism of 
desiring to escape Being and inevitably failing to do so would apply to the Other would be to assume 
that the Other is existentially the same as me, which Levinas strongly rejects: the Other is ‘absolutely 
foreign to me – refractory to every typology, to every genus, to every characterology, to every 
classification.’42 
 
ETHICS AND LEGALITY  
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What then are the consequences of the line of thought expressed in the previous section for the 
euthanasia debate? What is most notable is that questions of ethics and legality are completely severed 
in Levinas’s approach. That is to say, to address the legalisation of voluntary active euthanasia we will 
certainly not first ask ‘Is voluntary active euthanasia ethical?’ and then, if it passes this test, ask the 
further question of whether there are any additional factors that mean we ought to nevertheless 
maintain its illegality.  
 
We can see why this cannot work in a Levinasian context by considering the broader category of 
murder, which we have argued euthanasia always remains for Levinas and that we have seen to be 
equally the demand that we cause the other to live. One clearly cannot form a law in relation to such an 
account of murder, an account that states there is only one race of murders and that this race 
encompasses everyone insofar as we participate in the unfairly distributed products of the global 
economy. Putting the entire population of a country in jail for murder as they have failed to cause the 
other in the Third World to live might have a beautiful poetic truth, yet it serves little practical purpose 
and might well be taken as a reductio ad absurdum of Levinas’s position. That it is not such a reductio is 
because he never suggests a direct connection between these forms of responsibility. While Levinas 
declares that those who draw an ethical distinction between manslaughter and murder or between 
negligence of the starving other and their violent annihilation are not awake enough, this does not mean 
that such distinctions are irrelevant in a court of law. Levinas has no interest in forgiving and forgetting 
the deeds of concentration camp guards or stating equal legal culpability for the one in the gas chamber 
and the one who locked the door. This is just one aspect of the distinction between the incalculable 
ethical dimension of our primordial existence and calculable political reality. This lack of a direct relation 
is not, however, a claim that there is no relation. The ethical conditions legal responsibility and explains 
its possibility: the metaphysical guilt that accounts for the very fact that we are not living in a world 
without law or with only a Hobbesian law based on fear of violence.  
 
Where ethical justification was a precondition for legal justification, here ethical accusation is a 
precondition for legal accusation. Nevertheless, freed of a direct correlation between what is ethical and 
what can be legal, the basis for legislation becomes entirely practical. Though ethics does not distinguish 
between murder and manslaughter, the law is right to do so and the legislation depends more on what 
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works than what is right. Indeed, what is right is not merely unattainable but undesirable if imposed by 
law – as in the case of a country with its whole population imprisoned. 
 
Although the above was our primary target, it is worth noting that a second consequence of the above 
way of viewing euthanasia is that, even if it was to become legalised or tolerated, in a Levinasian 
perspective it cannot ever become routine or professionalised. If someone carrying out euthanasia is not 
merely committing murder but being asked to abandon a distinctly human mode of being and cut 
themselves off from the good beyond Being, then this act is final and unique. If every death is 
experienced simply an absolute scandal but an apocalypse – the end of the world – then the repeated 
enactment of such a task can never become part of a job description. A third consequence would be 
that – unlike the Levinasian justification of euthanasia found in Wolfs – there seems to be little basis for 
such distinctions in the debate such as whether the other is terminally ill and in pain or neither of these 
things, or whether we are killing them or letting them die. Although these may be practical issues for 
legislators to consider in terms of what works, as they do with where to draw the boundaries between 
self-defence, manslaughter and murder, in ethics drawing such lines is simply evidence of remaining in a 
state of half-sleep. 
 
In closing, let us clarify that it was never the aim of this essay to convert those engaging in the 
euthanasia debate to Levinasian ethics rather than some purportedly opposed ethical theory such as 
deontology or utilitarianism. The purpose of engaging in a study such as the above is to see that some of 
the deeper structures that ethical theories are formulaically plugged into – such as the assumption that 
whether euthanasia should be legalised is a matter of whether it is ethically permissible plus some 
further practical concerns – can be shaken by seeing that they are unintelligible in certain other ethical 
theories. In using an alternative approach to ethics to shake ourselves out of such common patterns of 
thought, we need not necessarily be committed to the truth of that theory or remain bond to it 
afterwards. The assumption that there is a set way of going about the interrogation of a dilemma in 
applied ethics, a method that we can run through with one ethical theory and then run through with 
another before tabulating the differing answers they give, produces a field of expertise rather than 
provoking philosophy. If philosophy is to play a role mediating between public and specialised debates, 
at the very least there is cause to hope that it will be through philosophers interrogating the deep strata 
of the debate rather than simply sketching and clarifying confused concepts on its surface. 
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